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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

A recent ruling handed down by Judge Bodine of the United States
district court, district of New Jersey, in the case of Pitney v. Duffy and
Pitney v. Ferguson, will be read with interest and, we believe, with great
satisfaction by accountants and others who have frequent contact with
the several income-tax laws.
It will be recalled that in article 31 of regulations 45, revised April 19,
1919, appertaining to the revenue acts of 1917 and 1918, the commissioner
of internal revenue ruled that:
“The amount of income tax paid for a bondholder by an obligor,
pursuant to a tax-free covenant in its bonds, is in the nature of
additional interest paid the bondholder and must be included in
his gross income.”
It seemed, at the time, that the commissioner was going far afield in so
ruling, and it is therefore very gratifying to find that after a careful
review and consideration of the subject Judge Bodine observes that:
“It never occurred to anyone that the normal tax so withheld by the
obligor corporation was income of the obligee during the years
1917 and 1918.”
He points out that the ruling was made in April, 1919, after the 1917
and 1918 returns were due to be filed; that there was no place provided for
this item of income on the blank tax returns for those years, and concludes
by holding that considering this tax as additional income is “obviously pure
fiction.”
It is sometimes difficult to comprehend the ponderous processes of the
legal mind and to follow it through the intricate mazes and narrow passages
leading to its conclusions, but no such difficulty is presented by Judge
Bodine’s sound reasoning and clarity of expression. It may be that our
interest in this decision proceeds from the fact that we entirely agree with
him and that therefore we find it an orderly procedure from logic to
conclusion. Even if this be conceded it is highly probable that the decision
is equally agreeable and satisfactory to others.
The above-mentioned case presents other features upon which the court
has also passed judgment in a similarly happy manner on tax questions
that might arise in any accountant’s practice and the entire case as set
forth in the decision should be carefully read.
A word of acclaim should be spoken for a taxpayer who relentlessly
seeks a judicial decision upon a matter of principle, regardless of the
financial sacrifice in which it involves him. The total amount of tax saved
by the taxpayer in litigating this case is about $3,500; $1,600 of which was
saved because of Judge Bodine’s findings with reference to tax-free covenant
bonds. The cost of getting the decision, including as it must accounting
and legal fees, court costs, etc., must have been a considerable portion of
the total saving of tax.
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We know of other rulings by the commissioner, that do not seem in
entire conformity with the law or the intention of congress, that it would
be gratifying to have a taxpayer take to court with the same determination
as was shown by John O. H. Pitney, et al., in the case under review.
DECISIONS
(291 Fed. 621—1917 and 1918 Act.)
Valuation as of March 1, 1913, as stated by taxpayer of property
acquired prior to that date, accepted, rather than government’s much lower
figure, as basis for computing profit on subsequent sale.
Contributions to a Grand Army Post held to be deductible as a con
tribution to a charitable organization.
Amount of tax withheld at source by an obligor corporation on its taxfree covenant bond interest held not to be income to bondholder as “addi
tional interest.”
United States District Court—District of New Jersey.
Decided June 30, 1923.
John O. H. Pitney et al.
v.
291 Fed. 621.
Charles V. Duffy, Fortner Collector.
John O. H. Pitney et al.
v.
Frank C. Ferguson, Collector.
J
Bodine, district judge. These cases were tried without a jury. In
the first suit three questions are involved. First, Marcus L. Ward, the
decedent, sold in 1917, a tract of meadow land in the neighborhood of the
Port Newark development in the city of Newark for $8,000. In his incometax return, he placed the March, 1913, value at $5,000, and accounted for a
profit of $3,000. The government fixed the actual value of the land at
$300, and assessed an additional tax of $4,700. Second, the government
assessed an additional tax upon the sum of $1,660.80, being 2 per cent.
normal tax paid by corporations issuing bonds with tax-free covenant clause
owned by the decedent. Third, the decedent contributed the sum of $300
to Marcus L. Ward Post, Grand Army of the Republic. The government
ruled that this was not deductible as a contribution to a charitable use and
assessed a tax thereon.
In suit No. 2, two questions are involved: First, the alleged receipt by
the decedent as income of the 2 per cent. normal tax paid by debtor cor
porations on tax-free covenant bonds held by the decedent in 1918, amount
ing to the sum of $1,558.60. Second, a $300 contribution to the Marcus L.
Ward Post, G. A. R., held not a contribution to a charitable use.
Following is a summary of the elements of claim:
Suit No. 1.
Count No. 1, for Year 1917.
Additional tax paid on meadow land ............................. $1,645.00
Additional tax paid on tax-free covenant bonds..........
581.27
Total claim for 1917 ...................................................
$2,226.27
Suit No. 1.
Count No. 2, for Year 1919.
Additional tax paid on account of contribution to
Marcus L. Ward Post ........................................
$ 192.00
Suit No. 2, for Year 1918.
Additional tax paid on tax-free covenant bonds .......... $1,059.84
Additional tax paid on account of contribution to
Marcus L. Ward Post ......................................
204.00

Total claim for 1918 ............................................. . .
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The question with respect to the profit on the sale of meadow land is
purely a fact question. In March, 1913, the Port Newark development was
a reality. The city assessed the property in question at some $1,200. The
reason the assessment was so low was that the land was not useful. No
buildings were thereon erected. The landowner received none of the
advantages of schools or police and fire protection. Consequently the
assessors, in making an equitable distribution of the burden of taxation,
lowered the assessment in proportion to the amount of rate applied for
the above purposes. In 1917 the assessed value was some $2,000. The
ratio between the assessed value in 1917 and 1913 is similar to the ratio
between the $8,000 actually received by Mr. Ward at the time he sold the
property and the 1913 value of $5,000 fixed by him. Further than this,
the testimony of real estate experts indicates that the 1913 valuation was
proper. I have no hesitancy in finding that the value of the land in March,
1913, was $5,000, but I do not wish to pass this phase of the case without
noting the action of the department in placing an arbitrary assessment, as
of March, 1913, of $300. Clearly no real estate situated in Newark could
increase between 1913 and 1917 over 2,500 per cent., nor is reason assigned
for the government’s action in selecting a valuation 25 per cent. of a city
assessment.
Secondly, as to the contribution to the Marcus L. Ward Post, G. A. R.:
These contributions of $300 in each of the years 1918 and 1919 were
deducted in pursuance of section 214 (a), subsection 11, of the revenue act
of 1918, approved February 24, 1919 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, sec.
6336⅛g), permitting deductions of contributions made within the taxable
year to corporations organized and operated exclusively for charitable
purposes. The Grand Army post in question was organized as a charitable
corporation under an act of the state of New Jersey to incorporate benevo
lent and charitable associations, approved April 9, 1875 (Rev. of N. J.
1877, p. 79).
The testimony of the officers of the post clearly indicates that the
charter provisions had been strictly adhered to, and the funds of the post
were used for alleviating the needs of members thereof who had, during
the civil war, rendered the highest service to the Union, The contributions
made by Mr. Ward were clearly deductible, and the action of the commis
sioner in assessing the taxes in question was illegal, and the executors are
entitled to recover the sum sued for. In re Rockefeller, 177 App. Div.
786, 165 N. Y. Supp. 154, the court held that the character of a corporation
was determined by its charter. In addition, the funds of the post were
actually used for charitable purposes.
The third question is with respect to the additional taxes based upon
the 2 per cent. normal tax paid by debtor corporations on tax-free covenant
bonds held by the decedent, upon which the commissioner assessed as addi
tional income tax during the years in question. The commissioner’s action
in this respect finds support in the ruling of the district court for the eastern
district of Pennsylvania in the case of Massey v. Lederer, 277 Fed. 123
[Supp. 545 U. S. Tax Cases 934]. This decision is not binding. The
sixteenth amendment to the federal constitution confers upon congress
“power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived.”
The 2 per cent. tax paid by the debtor corporation on tax-free covenant
bonds is not income in the hands of the obligee. The brief filed by counsel
for the plaintiffs is so exhaustive that to restate his argument is a profitless
task. To decide the case involves an acceptance of much that is most
admirably stated by him. The learned judge in Massey v. Lederer, supra,
bases his reasoning on three cases clearly distinguishable.
In Houston Belt & Terminal Railway Co. v. United States, 250 Fed. 1,
162 C. C. A. 173 (Fifth Circuit) [545 U. S. Tax Cases 265], there was a
corporate arrangement by which interest payments due on a mortgage of
a holding corporation, known as the Terminal Company, were paid direct
by four tenant railroad companies to the mortgagee. It was held that this
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payment was made on behalf of the Terminal Company, and that it was
a part of the latter’s income. From the opinion it appears that the real
fact was that no rental, or a wholly inadequate rental, was charged to its
tenants, they paying the interest on its mortgage to the mortgagee. The
court, of course, brushed aside such a transparent scheme in evasion of the
act (the excise tax act upon corporations of 1909 [36 Stat. 112]), and held
that the interest payments were equivalent to rent due and received by the
Terminal Company.
Similarly in Blalock v. Georgia Railway & Electric Co., 246 Fed. 387,
158 C. C. A. 451 (Fifth Circuit) [545 U. S. Tax Cases 96], a scheme to
circumvent the same act of 1909 was held to be bad. In that case there was
a corporate arrangement by which the plaintiff corporation made a lease
of its property to another corporation lessee, with provision that the lessee
should pay a dividend direct to the shareholders of the plaintiff corporation.
It was held that this dividend was in fact rental belonging in the first
instance to the plaintiff corporation, and therefore constituted income of the
plaintiff corporation. The present case has no similarity whatever to the
above two cases.
The third case cited is Rensselaer & Saratoga Railroad Co. v. Irwin,
239 Fed. 739, affirmed in 249 Fed. 726, 161 C. C. A. 636 [545 U. S. Tax
Cases 428]. The decision in this case was by the district court for the
northern district of New York, and the appeal was, of course, to the
circuit court of appeals for the second circuit. In that case the income-tax
act of October 3, 1913 (38 Stat. 114), was under consideration. There was
a lease of one corporation to another, whereby the lessee paid the interest
on certain bonds and also a dividend to the stockholders of the lessor cor
poration. The agreement, which was made May 1, 1871, and appears from
the opinion to have been intended to circumvent the income-tax act then
in effect, provided that the lessee corporation should not pay the then
income tax or any income tax that might thereafter be imposed on the said
dividends and interest, and that, if required by law to pay the same, it
might deduct the amount from the interest and dividends. The majority of
the court on appeal took the view that the money paid by the lessee was in
fact rent belonging to the lessor, on which it should pay income tax. The
attitude of the court is well expressed in the quotation (249 Fed. near the
bottom of page 728, 161 C. C. A. 638), in an earlier decision of the same
court, as follows:
“The fiction referred to cannot be permitted to accomplish a fraud
upon the statute and an evasion of its obligations.”
The cases all turn on the point that an attempt was being made to
evade a statute by preventing certain income from passing through a natural
conduit, the lessor corporation, to which it properly belonged. In the
present case the acts of congress themselves provide that the 2 per cent.
tax money shall be paid direct by the obligor corporation to the United
States government. There is no suggestion in the act, or in any agreement
of the parties, that the 2 per cent. is in fact additional income or interest
of the bondholder over and above the full interest rate agreed upon, all of
which the bondholder receives. It is a pure fiction through which the com
missioner endeavors to saddle the bondholder with this increment “in
the nature of additional interest” which he can never enjoy, and which he
does not even own the right to sue for. War revenue act 1917, sec. 1200
(Comp. St. 1918, sec. 6336b), provides that:
“Net income * * * shall include gains, profits and income
derived from salaries, wages,” etc., “also from interest, rents, dividends,”
etc., “or gains, or profits and income derived from any source whatever.”
The revenue act of 1918 describes, in section 213 (Comp. St. Ann.
Supp. 1919, sec. 6336⅛ff), income in similar language. Both acts provide
for the deduction, by the debtor corporation, of the 2 per cent. normal tax
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where obligations containing a tax-free covenant exist. It never occurred
to any one that the normal tax, so withheld by the obligor corporation, was
income of the obligee during the years 1917 and 1918.
The first regulation to the contrary is article 31 of regulation 45, as
revised April 19, 1919, after the returns for both the years 1917 and 1918
had been filed. The regulation is to the effect that the 2 per cent. tax
paid by the obligor corporation pursuant to the tax-free covenant is in the
nature of additional interest paid to the bondholder. Obviously this is pure
fiction, for that which the bondholder never received cannot be regarded
as falling within the definition of income as contained in either of the acts
in question. The tax-return blanks prepared by the government for the
years 1917 and 1918 contain no place where the taxpayer could set forth
this item not received by him. Congress, when it passed the revenue act
of 1921 (42 Stat. 254), provided, in section 234 (a) (3), referring to the
tax withheld on tax-free covenant bonds:
“Nor shall such tax be included in the gross income of the obligee.”
This action by congress is indicative of its desire to make it clear that
it was not taxing citizens upon a fiction but upon their income. It is—
“well settled * * * that the citizen is exempt from taxation,
unless the same is imposed by clear and unequivocal language, and that
where the construction of a tax law is doubtful, the doubt is to be
resolved in favor of those upon whom the tax is sought to be laid.”
Spreckels Sugar Co. v. McClain, collector, 192 U. S. 397, 24 Sup.
Ct. 376, 48 L. Ed. 496; American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington,
141 U. S. 468, 12 Sup. Ct. 55, 35 L. Ed. 821.
“Income” means that which has come in, just as expenditures mean
what has been paid out or goes out. United States v. Schillinger, 14
Blatchf. 71, Fed. Cas. No. 16,228 [545 U. S. Tax Cases 572]; United
States v. Indianapolis & St. Louis R. Co., 113 U. S. 711, 5 Sup. Ct. 716,
28 L. Ed. 1140; Railroad Co. v. United States, 101 U. S. 543, 25 L. Ed.
1068. See, also, definition of income by Mr. Justice Pitney in Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L. Ed. 521, 9 A. L. R. 1570
[545 U. S. Tax Cases 196].
The commissioner of internal revenue, when, on April 17, 1919, he
promulgated his ruling, with respect to imposing an additional tax, read
into the congressional enactment something which was not there when the
acts were originally passed, and was not placed there when they were
reënacted, and which was expressly prohibited in 1921. He reversed his
own previous rulings with respect to the matter, and decided that the tax
paid by the corporation upon its tax-free covenant bonds was an additional
income of the taxpayer.
Plaintiffs may have judgment in both suits on all counts.

(T. D. 3525—October 11, 1923)
Income taxes—Revenue acts of 1916 and 1917—Decision of court.
1. Appeal and Error—Finding Based on Conflicting Testimony Should
not be Disturbed.
Where a finding of fact is based on conflicting testimony taken in open
court, it should not be disturbed on appeal.
2. Income Tax—Dissolved Corporations—Liability of Stockholders.
Stockholders of a dissolved corporation are liable for federal taxes due
from the corporation to the extent of assets distributed on dissolution.
3. Constitutionality of Act of October 3, 1917—Retroactive
Application.
The act of October 3, 1917, which is retroactive as of January 1, 1917,
is constitutional and its provisions are applicable to a corporation which
was in existence during part of the year 1917 but was dissolved prior to
the passage of the act.
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4. Decision of the District Court Affirmed.
Decision of the district court (285 Fed. 410: T. D. 3442) affirmed.
(290 Fed. 167.)
The following decision of the United. States circuit court of appeals,
seventh circuit, affirming the judgment of the United States district court
for the district of Oregon in the case of United States v. Boss & Peake
Automobile Co., a corporation, C. L. Boss and E. W. A. Peake (T. -D.
3442) is published for the information of internal-revenue officers and others
concerned.
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Boss & Peake Automobile Co., a corporation, C. L. Boss and E. W. A.
Peake, plaintiffs in error, v. United States, defendant in error.
(June 18, 1923.)
Rudkin, circuit judge: The Boss & Peake Automobile Co. was organ
ized as a corporation under the laws of Oregon on November 8, 1916, with
a capital stock of $30,000, divided into 300 shares, of the par value of $100
each. While two qualifying shares were held by others, half of the capital
stock was in fact owned by Boss and the remaining half by Peake. The
corporation continued in business from the time of its formation until
dissolved, on or about June 22, 1917. On June 1, 1917, Peake transferred
his stock to Boss in consideration of the sum of $26,137.15, which was paid
by check. This amount was made up of the following items: Capital
$15,000, earnings $10,000, back salary $1,079.17, chair and desk $57.98. The
entire net income of the corporation from January to June 1, 1917, was
$22,549.94. On May 1, 1920, the government imposed a tax on this net
income under the revenue acts of September 8, 1916 (39 Stat. 756), and
October 3, 1917 (40 Stat. 300), amounting to the sum of $12,405.30. Boss
paid half of this tax, and the present suit was instituted by the govern
ment against the automobile company and against Boss and Peake indi
vidually to recover the residue, with penalty and interest added. The
validity or amount of the tax was not questioned; but Boss interposed a
cross complaint, claiming that upon the dissolution of the corporation its
assets were distributed to the stockholders and that Peake, having received
half of the assets, should pay half of the tax. The court below entered a
decree in favor of the government and against the defendant Boss, but
dismissed the complaint as to the defendant Peake and likewise the cross
complaint. From this decree Boss alone has appealed.
The court below, after a painstaking review of the testimony, found
that the transaction of June 1 was a transfer or sale of stock in fact as
well as in name, and not a division or distribution of the property and assets
of the corporation among stockholders.—United States v. Boss & Peake
Automobile Co. [D. C.] (285 Fed. 410).
We might content ourselves with the mere statement that this finding,
based as it is on conflicting testimony taken in open court, should not be
disturbed on appeal. But an independent review of the testimony leads to
the same conclusion. The withdrawal of Peake from the business had been
under consideration for some time before the final agreement was consum
mated. As early as March 26, 1917, a contract was prepared to that end.
Whether this contract was suggested by Boss or by Peake is not very
material, because it was entirely satisfactory to the former. By the terms
of this contract Peake agreed to sell and deliver his 150 shares of stock to
Boss on July 1, 1917, and Boss agreed to pay therefor 50 per cent. of the
inventory value of the goods, wares, merchandise, and open accounts of
the corporation, to be taken as of the latter date, within three days after
the completion of the inventory. This contract apparently failed of execu
tion because Peake refused to consent to the inventory method of fixing the
selling price of his stock. There is nothing in the record to indicate any
change of plan or purpose after that date. Probably the intention to dis
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solve the corporation was formed later. No doubt a dissolution was con
templated at least as early as June 1, and probably Peake had notice of that
intention. But why should that concern him? As soon as he had disposed
of his stock, the fate of the corporation rested in other hands, and he was
thereafter powerless to insist upon a dissolution, even if he so desired.
The fact that the selling price of the stock was fixed at approximately
half the value of the assets of the corporation is of little significance, in
view of the fact that each party owned half of the stock. Furthermore, the
price fixed was not exactly half the value of the assets, for certain con
tingent liabilities were assumed by Boss, and he was left more than half
the value of the assets for that reason. Boss admitted that he assumed all
known liabilities of the corporation and that Peake assumed none. This
assumption would doubtless include the tax imposed under the act of 1916,
but that was only a small fraction of the whole. On the entire record we
are satisfied that the present claim that there was a dissolution of the cor
poration and a division and distribution of its assets among stockholders on
June 1 is a mere afterthought, to escape liability for the tax. So far as
the record discloses, there was then no reason why there should be a disso
lution of the corporation, or a division and distribution of its assets, rather
than a transfer and sale of the Peake stock, or why the transaction should
assume one form rather than the other. There was a transfer of stock in
form at least, and we are satisfied there was a transfer in fact and in law.
It is unfortunate that the entire burden of the tax should fall upon one
stockholder, but apparent injustice will often result from the imposition
of a tax under a retroactive law. With such questions the courts have no
concern, where a liability is lawfully imposed under a valid law.
There is no error in the record, and the decree is therefore affirmed.
John A. Simmers and Harry B. Mills announce the consolidation of
their practices and the admission to partnership of Edward H. Adsit. The
practice will be carried on under the firm name of Simmers, Mills &
Adsit, with offices at 1201 A. G. Bartlett building, Los Angeles, California.
Lewis J. Laventhol and Isadore H. Krekstein announce the formation
of the partnership of Laventhol & Krekstein, with offices at 310 Bulletin
building, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

M. N. Schweitzer and Harry L. Carroll announce the formation of a
partnership, practising under the firm name of Schweitzer & Carroll, with
offices in Ashland, Kentucky.
E. M. Meyer announces the opening of an office at 426 Exchange
National Bank building, Spokane, Washington.

Hamilton M. Ross announces the removal of his office to the Main
building, 743 Main Avenue, Passaic, New Jersey.

Irvin A. Winegrad announces the removal of his offices to 310 Bulletin
building, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Joseph H. Geilen announces the removal of his office to Suite 1515
Chicago Temple building, 77 West Washington street, Chicago, Illinois.
Solomon Davis announces the opening of an office at 334 Fifth Avenue,
New York.
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